By Svante E. Cornell (vol. 2, no. 12 of the Turkey Analyst) 

After two decades of deep tensions with Iran, the AKP government has largely rebuilt relations with Turkey’s historical rival and neighbor. Yet its responses to the Iranian crisis – in which Prime Minister Erdoğan was embarrassingly among the first to congratulate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad upon his highly questionable re-election – appears to question the foundations of this rapprochement. Moreover, it indicates the limitations of Ankara’s newly found “zero-problem” foreign policy, which appears to mean that Turkey has no opinions on the basis of either interests, values or principles in its neighborhood.

By the Editors (vol. 1, no. 5 of the Turkey Analyst) 

Realizing the rising need for the transportation of the Caspian Basin’s energy resources to world markets in the 1990s, Turkish decision-makers claimed that “Turkey should become an energy corridor and an energy hub for producer and consumer countries”. All recent governments have to different degrees supported this vision. Turkey’s energy hub prospects were boosted by the rapid developments in the Turkish economy, which created an increasing demand for energy resources, and forced the “Energy Strategy” to the focal point of political and bureaucratic circles.

by John Daly (vol. 6 no. 13 of the Turkey Analyst)

Iran is now subject to three differing sets of sanctions – the U.S., the European Union and the United Nations. The sanctions have caught the Turkish government in an awkward position, as imported energy is critical to sustaining the country’s soaring economy and left Ankara scrambling for alternatives. Iran currently provides 44 percent of Turkey’s oil imports and Turkey is Iran’s biggest natural gas customer.

by Richard Weits (vol. 6, no. 7 of the Turkey Analyst)

Turkey has been using its energy and economic links with Russia and Iran to manage their political differences. Turkey’s relations with Russia improved considerably during the past decade, but those with Iran saw only a modest upturn due to enduring differences over regional security and religious-ideological principles. But in the past year, Turkey’s diverging response to the Arab Spring and especially the Syrian Civil War has strained both partnerships. No one talks anymore of an emerging Turkey-Iran-Russia axis in the heart of Eurasia.

by Richard Weits (vol. 6, no. 3 of the Turkey Analyst)

Turkey and Iran continue to resist the strong trends driving them to renew their Cold War of previous decades. Thus far, Turkey and Iran have been able to cooperate on some issues even while they conflict on others. Though they engage in a proxy war in Syria and fight over NATO’s missile defense policies, Turkey and Iran have developed perhaps their closest economic ties in modern history, with Western sanctions squeezing out competitors and allowing Turkey to finally achieve a trade surplus when dealing with Iran after years of massive deficits.