By Barçın Yinanç
Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is known to be a leader who does not chew his words, especially when targeting Western leaders. Yet although an overwhelming majority of the Turkish public opinion is strongly critical of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, Erdoğan has conspicuously withheld any criticism of Washington. The Turkish leadership has offered invaluable assistance to Trump’s plans for Gaza, and Washington has accommodated Turkey in Syria and tacitly bestowed legitimacy on Erdoğan’s domestic oppression. However, the central challenge for U.S.–Turkey relations will remain the management of tensions between two of Washington’s most important Middle Eastern allies, Israel and Turkey.
BACKGROUND:
Trump and Erdoğan had already set up a good rapport during Trump’s first term, and U.S. president’s favorable view of Erdoğan facilitates addressing long-standing strains in bilateral ties. Yet it was the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria 2024 that proved to be the real game-changer in the American-Turkish relation. Trump’s decision early on to open credit to Syria’s interim president Ahmed al-Shara, the former jihadist rebel leader and a Turkish protégé, led to a constructive cooperation on a key priority area for Ankara. More importantly, Washington’s change of strategy concerning the People’s Protection Units (YPG), considered by Ankara to be the Syrian wing of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), proved to be the key dynamic as a course correction.
U.S. political and military support to the YPG poisoned Turkish-American relations for more than a decade. Washington claimed to partner with the YPG to fight the so called Islamic State while Ankara accused its ally of backing a Kurdish armed group, thereby paving the way for the establishment of a Kurdish entity in its southern border. In January this year, Tom Barrack, the U.S. ambassador to Ankara and Trump’s special envoy to Syria, announced YPG’s mission to be accomplished, removing the major obstacle to improved U.S.-Turkey relations. “The original purpose of the SDF as the primary anti-ISIS force on the ground has largely expired, as Damascus is now both willing and positioned to take over security responsibilities, including control of ISIS detention facilities and camps,” he stated.
Speaking during the Antalya Diplomacy Forum on April 17, Barrack praised Turkey and Erdoğan and appeared to be siding with Turkey – and Syria -- against Israel. Barrack took issue with Israel’s view of Syria and Turkey as adversaries, rather than potential partners, calling it a “strategic mistake.” Israel deployed troops to southern Syria in the wake of Assad’s ouster, and has bombed military facilities in the country. Barrack lamented the constant Israeli incursions that threaten to destabilize the al-Sharaa regime and clash with Turkey’s interests. Israeli representatives have also repeatedly expressed support for Kurdish aspirations, raising concerns in Ankara. Barrack said that he’s been consistent in telling Israel that the “inclusion” of Turkey is the “only answer” to securing the ceasefire in Gaza.
While Trump prioritizes the security of Israel, bringing stability in the Middle East requires the normalization of Israel’s relations with its neighbors. Achieving this, however, necessitates managing, if not resolving comprehensively, the Palestinian issue. In that respect, Turkey plays a crucial role and has already offered valuable services. As the most vocal critic of Israel and a staunch defender of Hamas, Erdoğan’s endorsement of the plan that foresaw the end of Hamas’ rule in Gaza was invaluable and bestowed legitimacy to Trump’s plan. Not only did Erdoğan sign on to Trump’s plan, becoming one of the four leaders signing a declaration in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, but he also used Turkey’s leverage over Hamas. If Trump was instrumental in convincing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept the plan, Turkey’s pressure was crucial in securing Hamas’ acquiescence.
Barrack recalled that Trump called Erdoğan shortly before the ceasefire in Gaza was reached last October, asking for his assistance in bringing two leaders of Hamas on board. It would not have happened without the efforts of Erdoğan, Fidan and National Intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin, Barrack emphasized.
IMPLICATIONS:
It is not a coincidence that, Erdoğan – who never received an invitation during Joe Biden’s term – was finally gratified with an invitation to and entered the Oval Office two days after he endorsed Trump’s plans for Gaza. Meanwhile, a statement by ambassador Barrack right before Erdoğan’s visit laid down openly the gist of U.S.-Turkish relations, with Barrack remarking that “President Trump says, let’s give them what they need, legitimacy.” The statement, which presumably alluded to the need to rehabilitate Erdoğan’s image in Washington, also implied turning a blind eye to and legitimizing Erdoğan’s domestic transgressions. Washington has remained silent as Turkey has been witnessing one of the most severe waves of political repression in its history, targeting the main opposition party.
Meanwhile, the Turkish leadership provides legitimacy to Trump’s plans for the Middle East. Turkey’s decision to use its leverage over Hamas has in return been rewarded by the U.S. Not only has Washington ended its decade-long support to the Kurdish YPG, but the Trump administration has also green-lighted a solution to the longstanding Halkbank issue between the U.S. and Turkey. The agreement over Turkish state-owned Halkbank, which stands accused of evading U.S. sanctions on Iran, was revealed in early March. Not coincidentally, Turkish officials abstained from expressing any criticism of the U.S. for the war against Iran. This also bespeaks Ankara’s wish to mediate between Washington and Tehran and Turkey contributed to the mediation efforts that were led by Pakistan together with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, the Iran war has revealed Turkish defense vulnerabilities. The package deal with the U.S. that includes modernization kits for Turkey’s existing F-16 fleet as well as the procurement of a new batch of F-16s comes at a high cost, and Ankara seeks a discounted offer. Also, there has been no progress on the F-35 issue, with Ankara blaming the Israeli lobby for the stalemate. Turkey is eager to be allowed to return to the program from which it was expelled following its purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system.
Delays in the delivery of the initial engines for Turkey’s domestically produced fighter jet Kaan have further heightened concerns in Ankara. These setbacks exacerbate Turkey’s growing airpower vulnerability at a moment when global politics is increasingly unstable and unpredictable.
CONCLUSION:
It was consistent with President Trump’s leadership style to disengage from an armed non-state actor – the Kurds in Syria -- and instead rely on a middle power like Turkey, particularly as Washington seeks to delegate the stabilization of key regions to allies and partners. In the short to medium term, however, the central challenge for U.S.–Turkey relations will remain the management of tensions between two of Washington’s most important Middle Eastern allies, Israel and Turkey.
Turkey and Israel pursue fundamentally divergent policies in Syria, as the latter wants a weak and fragmented Syria. At present, Ankara appears to have drawn Washington closer to its own position. However, the fragile nature of the deal between Damascus and YPG as well as that between Syria and Israel remains a potential irritant. This is also important in view of the new process initiated to solve the decades old Kurdish problem.
Moreover, Israel’s approach to implementing the second stage of Trump’s Gaza plan is highly problematic. Turkey has reciprocated U.S. disengagement from the Kurdish YPG by encouraging Hamas to accept a framework that remains ambiguous about the protection of Palestinian rights. Ankara though will find it difficult to pressure Hamas to remain loyal to the plan in the face of Israel’s policies in Gaza and in the West Bank. Israel’s quest for regional supremacy threatens to impede Erdoğan’s collaboration with Trump.
And if Trump meant to improve Erdoğan’s standing among Washington’s circles by bestowing legitimacy on him, this remains unfulfilled as Congress is still highly hostile to Turkey, which explains the continuation of the stalemate in defense ties.
AUTHOR'S BIO:
Barçın Yinanç is a foreign policy commentator at the Turkish news site t24.