By M. K. Kaya and Halil M. Karaveli (vol. 3, no. 3 of the Turkey Analyst)
As Iran’s nuclear ambitions cause growing concern among Western powers, Turkey remains committed to its ambition of staking out a mediating position in the Iranian-Western stand-off. However, the Turkish policy rests on the unrealistic assumption that Ankara can somehow avoid hard choices. Indeed, Turkey’s position is set to become increasingly untenable as the tensions rise. Although it would seem that Ankara faces a choice between retaining the trust of the United States and remaining true to the eastern vocation of its foreign policy, appearing to be an advocate of Iran is ultimately undermining Turkey’s credibility in the Middle East as well.
By Svante E. Cornell (vol. 2, no. 12 of the Turkey Analyst)
After two decades of deep tensions with Iran, the AKP government has largely rebuilt relations with Turkey’s historical rival and neighbor. Yet its responses to the Iranian crisis – in which Prime Minister Erdoğan was embarrassingly among the first to congratulate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad upon his highly questionable re-election – appears to question the foundations of this rapprochement. Moreover, it indicates the limitations of Ankara’s newly found “zero-problem” foreign policy, which appears to mean that Turkey has no opinions on the basis of either interests, values or principles in its neighborhood.
By the Editors (vol. 1, no. 5 of the Turkey Analyst)
Realizing the rising need for the transportation of the Caspian Basin’s energy resources to world markets in the 1990s, Turkish decision-makers claimed that “Turkey should become an energy corridor and an energy hub for producer and consumer countries”. All recent governments have to different degrees supported this vision. Turkey’s energy hub prospects were boosted by the rapid developments in the Turkish economy, which created an increasing demand for energy resources, and forced the “Energy Strategy” to the focal point of political and bureaucratic circles.
by John Daly (vol. 6 no. 13 of the Turkey Analyst)
Iran is now subject to three differing sets of sanctions – the U.S., the European Union and the United Nations. The sanctions have caught the Turkish government in an awkward position, as imported energy is critical to sustaining the country’s soaring economy and left Ankara scrambling for alternatives. Iran currently provides 44 percent of Turkey’s oil imports and Turkey is Iran’s biggest natural gas customer.
by Richard Weits (vol. 6, no. 7 of the Turkey Analyst)
Turkey has been using its energy and economic links with Russia and Iran to manage their political differences. Turkey’s relations with Russia improved considerably during the past decade, but those with Iran saw only a modest upturn due to enduring differences over regional security and religious-ideological principles. But in the past year, Turkey’s diverging response to the Arab Spring and especially the Syrian Civil War has strained both partnerships. No one talks anymore of an emerging Turkey-Iran-Russia axis in the heart of Eurasia.
The Turkey Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey. It includes topical analysis, as well as a summary of the Turkish media debate.
Sign up for upcoming events, latest news and articles from the CACI Analyst