By Stephen Blank (vol. 8, no. 4 of the Turkey Analyst) 

Given the prominent role that Ankara aspires to have in regional and world affairs what does the Turkish passivity in relation to the developments in the Black Sea region, and specifically regarding the case of Crimea, say about those avowed aspirations? Turkey's inability and unwillingness to stand up to Russian neo-expansionism – something history should have taught Ankara to be extremely wary of – serves to further underline that Turkey's erstwhile reputation for conducting a strong independent foreign policy was never deserved.

By M. K. Kaya and Svante E. Cornell (vol. 1, no. 12 of the Turkey Analyst)

Like most other states, Turkey was hard pressed to respond to the war in Georgia. For Turkey, the war threatened its position in the Caucasus, as well as its long-term objective of becoming a hub of European energy transportation. Prime Minister Erdogan chose to moment in order to promote a form of Caucasian alliance - a well-intentioned but somewhat surreal proposal in the middle of a raging war. The crisis exposed the government's lack of attention to the Caucasus, and the need for a serious rethink of Turkey's role there

by Richard Weits (vol. 6, no. 7 of the Turkey Analyst)

Turkey has been using its energy and economic links with Russia and Iran to manage their political differences. Turkey’s relations with Russia improved considerably during the past decade, but those with Iran saw only a modest upturn due to enduring differences over regional security and religious-ideological principles. But in the past year, Turkey’s diverging response to the Arab Spring and especially the Syrian Civil War has strained both partnerships. No one talks anymore of an emerging Turkey-Iran-Russia axis in the heart of Eurasia.

by Richard Weitz (vol. 6, no. 5 of the Turkey Analyst)

After years of stalemate, recent months have seen renewed efforts to secure Turkey’s accession to the EU. French President François Hollande has adopted a more favorable position regarding accession than his predecessor.  Following his election in 2012, Hollande’s administration advocated opening some of the eight chapters of the accession talks that were closed. Other EU officials have expressed concerns about the EU needing Turkey more than vice-versa. German officials have also adopted a more positive attitude towards Turkey’s accession drive. Meanwhile, Turkish officials are making moves, such as threatening to abandon the EU and seek membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, presumably to give Ankara more leverage in the accession negotiations.

by Halil M. Karaveli (vol. 6, no. 04 of the Turkey Analyst)

A settlement of Turkey’s Kurdish issue requires that the Kurds are satisfied and that the Turks are persuaded. Satisfying the demands of the Kurds will necessarily bring about a redefinition of the identity of Turkey. It will above all reverse the traditional role of the Turkish state, which historically has sought to regiment society; it would enshrine a whole new principle, making it the duty of the state to respect societal diversity and uphold societal freedom. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan may consider deleting references to Turkishness from the constitution, and to allow the Kurdish identity a greater space, but it is less clear that he would also agree to dilute the state’s and his own power.