Hasan Cemal writes in t24 that Erdoğan’s agenda is more or less the same as the agenda of the regime of military tutelage in the past. Turkey has so far not been able to face up to its military problem. To this day, no one has been held accountable for the 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 military coups, nor for the string of assassinations during these decades. And regarding the military itself, it has neither questioned its own tradition of coups nor engaged in any kind of self-criticism. Now, this coup tradition is being covered up by the court decisions to dismiss the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases. And it is Erdoğan who is doing the covering. But the problem is not disappearing. The military problem remains unsolved, and it cannot be brushed under the carpet. If we want to clear the way for democracy and the rule of law in Turkey, then we need to face up to the military problem and solve it, just as much as there is need to fight against Erdoğan.
Nuray Mert in Cumhuriyet writes that the opposition circles dangerously put their faith in chaos to get rid of the government. It is dangerous to hope that chaos is going to weaken the regime, instead of engaging in a serious struggle for democracy. Not only is an international isolation of Turkey not the solution that the opposition circles think; it will also provoke more extreme reactions from the regime. Which country has so far fared good after its leader was declared a “dictator?” We see what end that has befallen these countries. In such situations, the whole country crumbles together with the regime. None of the paths of the opposition offers any hope for the future: not the extreme nationalism of MHP, with its hostility to the Kurds; not the Kurdish movement, which is only provoking the regime to be more repressive and Turkish nationalist; not the democrats and liberals who simply put faith in anything that they think is going to weaken the regime.
Levent Gültekin in Diken notes that Tayyip Erdoğan has polarized society. He has a done a lot of harm to those that he has treated as the “others.” Now there is a great rage against him in an important part of society. But at the same time, another part of society is reflexively defensive and protective of him, saying “The Westerners are out to get Erdoğan, but we are not going let him be sacrificed.” They see everyone that is angry at Erdoğan as an “enemy.” We need reason so that this anger and the fanatic support together don’t bring about a major disaster for society. The question has ceased to be about getting rid of Tayyip Erdoğan. The real issue is how a transition is going to be enabled, who is going to reassemble the country, and how internal peace is going to be reconstituted. What matters most, Tayyip Erdoğan or Turkey? That is, what is the priority: putting out the fire, or punishing the one who lit the fire? This choice is going to determine how the country’s course after Tayyip Erdoğan is going to look. This is no time to act with emotion, impulses and rage.
Ergun Babahan in Özgür Düşünce writes that it is becoming increasingly clear that the Palace wants to have a big purge in the ranks of the military. It is equally clear that the general staff is resisting this. The pro-palace media provoked a reaction from the general staff by its recent stories claiming that “Gülenist officers in the armed forces are going to carry out a coup.” The General staff denied these allegations in a forceful language, stating that “no one can take action outside the chain of command.” This stance amounted to checking the demands for a purge. In fact, the fight is not really about the issue of the Gülenists, but about the relations to the United States and NATO. This is not an exclusive AKP operation, but a plan that is being implemented jointly with the neo-nationalists, the ulusalcı. The ulusalcı are attempting to regain the positions within the armed forces that they lost with the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases. The aim is to purge the cadres that have been on NATO duty in Brussels and Pentagon, and that are deemed to be close to the Western culture. Thus, it is not a question of purging Gülenists; what is taking place is a fight between the pro-NATO and ulusalcı cadres of the military. If the latter prevail, the command chain of the armed forces for years to come will be refashioned in accordance with the wishes of the ulusalcı. We are witnessing a fight that is going to determine Turkey’s place in the world.
Verda Özer in Hürriyet reports that Erdoğan offered Obama the services of the Turkish military in Syria against ISIS, in return for which he asked the U.S. to stop supporting the Kurdish PYD. According to what Turkish sources have told me, Ankara made the following suggestion to Washington during the visit of Erdoğan: “Come, give up PYD. In its place, we can – together with the Arab and Turcoman groups that we support – fight a land war against ISIS.” Turkey also asked for U.S. air cover to enable the Turkish army to intervene in Syria. To this, the U.S. replied “I will not give up on PYD.” Washington also expressed the reservation that if “the Turkish army were to intervene, Russia might hit it.” In fact, the U.S. is wary of Turkey becoming entrenched and powerful in Iraq and Syria. According to what my sources relate, Washington urged Ankara to “return to the solution process,” to which Erdoğan replied “I have not broken off the solution process, the process is in the refrigerator.” And he reminded that Turkey’s, and thus his own, focus right now is the fight against PKK. According to what the sources relate, the Turkish side made a connection between the solution process and the PYD. It emphasized that as long as the armed support of the U.S. for PYD continues, it will not be possible to restart the solution process.
The Turkey Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey. It includes topical analysis, as well as a summary of the Turkish media debate.