by Richard Weitz (vol. 6, no. 12 of the Turkey Analyst)
Since the dispersal of the first protest at Taksim’s Gezi Park towards the end of May 2013, numerous anti-government protests have erupted throughout Turkey, against what it is seen as the insensitive and authoritarian policies of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Torn between competing goals, the Obama administration has reacted very cautiously to the protests. U.S. officials have criticized the Turkish police for overzealous use of force, but have not taken issue with Erdoğan personally. This approach has the advantage of not antagonizing the Erdoğan government, which is seen as a strong regional security ally in Washington, especially regarding Syria and Iran. But this familiar approach - repeating the past pattern in bilateral relations, with the U.S. downplaying Turkish human rights and democracy concerns -- risks weakening the popular foundations of the alliance, which in turn constrain the partnership’s future potential.
by Gareth Jenkins (vol. 6, no. 11 of the Turkey Analyst)
The unprecedented anti-government protests that have erupted across Turkey pose the most serious challenge to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan since his Justice and Development Party (AKP) first took office in November 2002. Although it is still too early to assess the extent of the threat to Erdoğan’s grip on power, he has been seriously weakened. At the very least, his dreams of establishing a presidential system and ruling the country singlehandedly for the next decade have suffered a fatal blow.
by Ben Welch (vol. 6 no. 11 of the Turkey Analyst)
The changing shape of the Turkish business community, typified in part by the astonishing rise of Turkey’s small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) to national and international prominence, is a significant feature of the new environment which now plays a part in shaping political and economic decision making in Turkey. As the economic successes of the last decade remain a key element of the political narrative of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), and with the government seeking to guarantee and strengthen its core vote, it can be predicted that the influence of this distinct group of business interests is going to become more pronounced over time.
by Murad Batal al-Shishani (vol. 6, no. 10 of the Turkey Analyst)
On February 20, 2013, Syrian rebels and the Kurdish militia—which had fought each other for months in a town near the Turkish border—agreed to a ceasefire. Ras al-Ain is an ethnically mixed town of Arabs, Kurds, Armenians, Chechens, and so on. In the past few months, the town has become a theatre playing out Turkey’s fears concerning the ongoing crisis in Syria, its role and the relationship with various armed groups there, including jihadists. In addition to its close relations with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), Turkey has supported local jihadist groups in Ras al-Ain, while it appears to have proven unable to control or open links with the most influential jihadist group, al-Nusra.
The Türkiye Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Türkiye. It includes topical analysis, as well as a summary of the Turkish media debate.
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