Turkey's 2012 Re-adjustment to Post-"Zero Problems" in the Aftermath of the Arab Awakenings
By Joshua W. Walker (vol. 4, no. 24 of the Turkey Analyst)
Turkey’s emergence in the 21st century as a Middle Eastern power has been in the making for the last decade, but only fully crystallized in the wake of the “Arab Awakenings” this year. Unlike Iran and Saudi Arabia that actively supported counter-protest movements to deflect attention away from their own domestic shortcomings, Turkey’s vibrant civil society nudged the government onto the side of the newly emerging Arab democratic movements. Turkey has earned a reputation under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) as being a pragmatic and active actor in the Middle East. Despite the successes of AKP’s foreign policy in the last decade in opening new markets and expanding into its neighborhood through a policy of “zero problems with neighbors,” the Arab spring of 2011 has forced Ankara to confront the new realities of the Middle East. Ankara is now in need of a new foreign policy, post-Arab awakenings.
Turkish-US Relations in 2011 and Beyond: There May be Trouble Ahead
By Richard Weitz (vol. 4, no. 24 of the Turkey Analyst)
The year 2011 saw a “regression toward the mean” in Turkey’s relation with the United States. 2010 had the deadly Israeli flotilla raid, the misfired Iranian nuclear negotiations, and the WikiLeaks’ revelations about the negative views held by some American diplomats regarding Turkey’s leaders who were described as dangerous extremists, megalomaniacal, and corrupt. The Turkey-U.S relationship has rebounded nicely in 2011, with Ankara and Washington collaborating on a range of issues. But danger signs abound beneath the surface, suggesting that 2012 and beyond might not be as rosy.
Has Erdogan Reached His "Democratic Limits"?
By Halil M. Karaveli (vol. 4, no. 23 of the Turkey Analyst)
Internal and external dynamics no longer compel Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to transcend his democratic limits. It was the confluence of a particular set of external and internal dynamics that worked to ensure the Turkish Islamists’ conversion to democracy. These dynamics are no longer at work. Instead, as Turkey’s strategic value – and Erdoğan’s international fame – has soared in the wake of the Arab revolutions, traditional Turkish state authoritarianism is being offered a new lease on life.
Tactical Allies and Strategic Rivals: Turkey's Changing Relations With Iran
By Gareth H. Jenkins (vol. 4, no. 23 of the Turkey Analyst)
On November 26, 2011, General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, a senior commander in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, declared that, if Iran came under attack from the U.S. or Israel, its first response would be to target elements of NATO’s missile shield in Turkey. The threat was the latest – and most explicit – Iranian expression of unease at Turkey’s willingness to deploy the missile shield since the decision was first announced on September 2, 2011. It put additional pressure on a bilateral political relationship already strained by the popular uprisings in the Arab world. The tensions will have reassured those in the West who had been alarmed by the apparent rapprochement between the two countries in recent years, particularly Turkey’s vigorous defense of Iran’s nuclear program in 2010. But, in reality, the relationship has always been more nuanced and multilayered than a simple dichotomy of friend or foe.
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