By Barçın Yinanç

Competing visions for the future of post-Assad Syria has further deteriorated the already strained Turkish-Israeli relations. While Turkey’s clout in Syria stands in the way of Israel’s efforts to fragment Syria and undermine its territorial integrity, Israel’s actions disrupt Turkey’s strategy of a unified Syria. As a result both perceive each other as posing a threat to their respective national interests. Ankara will seek Washington’s support for crisis management and President Recep Tayip Erdoğan will use his good rapport with President Donald Trump to keep the tension from spiraling into a direct military confrontation with Israel. The fragile detente between Turkey and Israel will have to be monitored closely by the United States.

BACKGROUND: The fall of Bashar al-Assad on December 8, 2024, has opened a new confrontation line between Turkey and Israel, pitting Syria’s two neighbors against each other. On April 9, 2025, Azerbaijan hosted Turkish and Israeli officials for talks to ease the tension in Syria. Turkish Defense Ministry officials informed that the first technical talks were held in Baku to set up a de-confliction mechanism to avoid potential clashes or misunderstandings over military operations in Syria. 

The end of the decades-long Assad regime was an unintended consequence of Israel’s military strategy following Hamas’ deadly attack on October 7, 2023. The Israeli army dealt a serious blow to Iran’s proxies in Syria, which unexpectedly led to the takeover of Damascus by opposition forces. The Islamist Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) spearheaded the offensive of the rebel forces, whose leader, Ahmet al-Sharaa, eventually became the country’s new, transitional leader. Al-Sharaa’s jihadist past and his affinity to Turkey, confirmed by the visit of the Turkish Intelligence Chief İbranim Kalın to Damascus only four days after the takeover, rang alarm bells in Israel. As early as January 10, 2025, an Israeli government commission released a warning that Syria could become the stage for a direct conflict between Turkey and Israel.A Turkey-oriented Syria ruled by Sunni Islamists could pose a greater threat to Israel than a Syria allied with Iran, the report of the so-called Nagel Commission, chaired by a former Israeli National Security Council head, concluded. The day Bashar al-Assad fled to Russia, the Israeli army moved units into several locations in a buffer zone that separates the Israeli side of the Golan Heights from the Syrian side of the border. Meanwhile, the Israeli air force has launched several offensives, striking hundreds of military targets to destroy the Syrian military assets, hitting strategic weapon stockpiles to stop “them from falling into the hands of the extremists.”Turkey maintained a rather restrained rhetoric even at that stage, avoiding harsh accusations against the Israeli government. “Israel has developed a precautionary package based on the worst possible scenario in Syria. As Israel is not sure about where the new administration (in Syria) will stand, it has endorsed a strategy; one which is very dangerous,” Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said in mid-December, adding that Ankara asked Israel, via intermediaries, to stop bombing.Al-Sharaa’s assurances early on that Damascus does not want any conflict with Israel and that the new regime will not let Syria be used as a launch-pad for attacks fell on deaf ears in Israel. Official statements that Israel will support Kurdish groups in northern Syria and the Druze minority in the south created an additional irritant at a time when Ankara threatened military action against the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in northern Syria.The Democratic Union Party (PYD), as well as the YPG, which makes up the backbone of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), are seen by Turkey as offshoots of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), but talks between the SDF and Damascus under U.S. mediation forced Turkey to refrain from military action in northeast Syria. As Turkey has embarked on a new peace process to solve the decades-long Kurdish problem, Ankara is waiting to see how the talks between Damascus and the SDG will proceed.The risk of confrontation between Turkey and Israel heightened following news about Turkish-Syrian military cooperation. While Turkish defense ministry officials insisted that the cooperation aimed at training the Syrian army, some media outlets known to have good connections to the Turkish government reported about plans to deploy forces in bases in Syria. One media outlet claimed that Turkey “has begun efforts to take control of Tiyas air base, also known as T4, and is preparing to deploy air defense systems there.”Within a few days following these reports, Israel bombed the sites and destroyed the T4 airport. The Israeli press reported that the strikes were meant to be a message to Turkey to stop its military expansion in Syria. Since Assad’s fall there have been more than 750 Israeli air and artillery strikes and more than 230 ground incursions. The day Israel carried out the air operation against the T 4 airport, Turkish foreign minister Fidan told an international outlet Turkey did not want a confrontation with Israel in Syria. Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met President Donald Trump in the Oval Office on April 7 and watched the U.S. president shower Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan with praise in front of the cameras. Trump said he could help mediate between the two leaders, while he asked Netanyahu to be “reasonable.” When it was revealed two days later that the two countries' officials met for de-conflicting talks, Washington was said to have encouraged the two capitals to de-escalate.

IMPLICATIONS: Had Hamas’ deadly October 7 attack not taken place, Ankara was preparing to host Netanyahu. Having missed the chance of mending fences with the previous Israeli government, which included more moderate forces, Erdoğan had decided to go ahead with normalization even though Netanyahu’s new cabinet included hawkish, ultra-right wing parties.  But following October 7, the envoys were called back; Ankara even terminated officially all trade with Israel, although the Turkish opposition claims that the economic relations continue to be pursued indirectly.

Turkey sees Israel’s post-October 7 strategy as both inhuman in terms of the suffering and death in Gaza and as extremely dangerous for the region. Yet while President Trump’s plans to depopulate Gaza were met with harsh criticism by Foreign Minister Fidan, it is worth noting that some pro-government pundits voiced the possibility of migration for Gazans under the Islamic terminology ‘hijrah.” And ironically, Israel’s attacks against Iran’s proxies in Lebanon and Syria in the latter case played into the hands of Turkey, since it led to the unintended consequence of the collapse of the regime in Damascus.

Assad’s fall potentially opened the door for the return of more than three million Syrian refugees in Turkey and Ankara looks forward to reaping the economic benefits of the reconstruction of Syria. And more importantly, the YPG, which controlled north eastern Syria, faced the risk of losing its territorial and economic gains. Yet Israel’s stance on Syria disrupts all of Turkey’s plans. The two countries stand diametrically opposed on both the Palestinian problem and Syria’s future.  However, the stakes in Syria are higher for Turkey compared to the Palestinian question. In fact, many in Turkey would question whether the Palestinian problem is a national cause. Developments in Syria, on the other hand, directly affect Turkey’s national interests.

With a 911 km land border, Syria’s stability is extremely critical for Turkey, and the solution of the Kurdish problem will depend on the talks between Syria’s new rulers and the Kurdish factions in the country. Ankara is firmly opposed to the federal solution that the Syrian Kurds favor; it fears that it would encourage similar aspirations among Turkey’s Kurds, and holds that regional stability will benefit from a unified Syria. Israel sees it differently; it’s no secret that Israel wants a weak and fragmented Syria. Israel’s policy is based on its calculation that a divided Syria is the best guarantee for its security while a united Syria could eventually pose a threat.

CONCLUSIONS: Competing visions for the future of post-Assad Syria has further deteriorated the already strained Turkish-Israeli relations. While Turkey’s clout in Syria stands in the way of Israel’s efforts to fragment Syria and undermine its territorial integrity, Israel’s actions disrupt Turkey’s strategy of a unified Syria. As a result both perceive each other as posing a threat to their respective national interests.

While a full-scale war between Turkey and Israel is highly unlikely, a misunderstanding or an accident spiraling into a military clash cannot be excluded. Turkish officials have repeatedly indicated that Turkey won’t remain idle if Israel continues its military incursions and have warned that Israel’s interferences in the sectarian conflicts in Syria – notably Israel’s siding with the Druze minority against the government in Damascus – risk exacerbating the internal turmoil. In addition, a potential Israeli involvement in the dialogue between Damascus and the SDF would be viewed as provocative by Ankara.

Convinced that Syria’s new rulers are under Turkey’s influence, President Trump appears to have no problem with Turkey’s clout in the country. Trump has met al-Sharaa during his visit to the Gulf and announced his decision to lift US sanctions on Syria. By contrast, Netanyahu will try to use his leverage over Washington to keep Syria weak and block any step that will help Syria’s new rulers consolidate their power. Ankara will seek Washington’s support for crisis management and Erdoğan will use his good rapport with Trump to keep the tension from spiraling into a direct military confrontation with Israel.

The fragile detente between Turkey and Israel will have to be monitored closely by the United States.

AUTHOR BIO: Barçın Yinanç is a foreign policy commentator at the Turkish news site t24