Israel’s Supremacy Compels Turkey to Fortify Its Home Front
By Halil Karaveli
The 12-day war between Israel and Iran, and Israel’s demonstration of its crushing military superiority, has added renewed urgency to the Turkish efforts to achieve reconciliation with the Kurds. More than anything else, Turkey fears a Kurdish alliance with Israel. Co-opting the Kurds is both a national security imperative and a necessary condition for the perpetuation of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s regime. The end of the PKK and of the conflict that has plagued Turkey for four decades may well revive Erdoğan’s political fortunes. But the question remains if societal reconciliation can be achieved when reforms for the Kurds are coupled with oppressive measures against the main opposition party. And the Kurds have reason to ask how much they can trust a democratization that is granted from above by a state that could renege on it when it no longer suits its interests.
BACKGROUND: On June 17, Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the far right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the key partner of Erdoğan, claimed that “Israel’s political and strategic ambition is to encircle Anatolia and to prevent, on behalf of its patron, the realization of the goal of a Turkey without terrorism.” The latter is a reference to the peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) that Bahçeli initiated in 2024 while the “patron” of Israel refers, presumably, to the United States.
On October 22, 2024, Bahçeli stunned the country by suggesting that Abdullah Öcalan – the leader of the outlawed PKK which Öcalan founded in 1978 and that has waged an insurgency against the Turkish state since 1984 – should be granted parole if he renounces violence and disbands the organization. On February 27, Öcalan called on the PKK to dissolve and lay down its arms. On May 22, the PKK announced its dissolution. The organization is expected to begin handing over its weapons in early July.
The 12-day war between Israel and Iran, and Israel’s demonstration of its crushing military superiority, has added renewed urgency to the Turkish efforts to achieve reconciliation with the Kurds. Ankara has become increasingly worried that regional turmoil could stoke domestic instability. Above all, Turkey fears a Kurdish alliance with Israel. Last November Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar described the Kurdish people as victims of Turkish and Iranian oppression and Israel’s “natural ally” and said that Israel should strengthen its ties with them. Some Kurds are indeed fantasizing about Israeli-Kurdish hegemony in the Middle East.
In October 2024, the pro-PKK newspaper Yeni Özgür Politika republished a section of Öcalan’s Manifesto for Democratic Civilization, written more than a decade ago, in which he suggested that the PKK could align with the United States and Israel against Turkey. That prescription was at odds with the traditionally anti-Israel and anti-American thinking that informs the leftist tradition in Turkey from which the PKK sprang; however, U.S. military-political and Israeli political support for the PKK’s offshoots in Syria during the last decade has changed Kurdish perceptions. Today Öcalan advocates for an alliance with Turkey, but it’s by no means clear that the PKK is fully on the same page as its founding leader. On June 17, Selahattin Demirtaş, the imprisoned former co-chair of Peoples’ Democracy party (HDP) – the DEM Party’s predecessor – was compelled to warn fellow Kurds, as it would seem, against the temptation of “imperialist schemes” and said that such “moves will end with disaster.” Demirtaş pledged that “We are going to stand united as the society of Turkey and if need be sacrifice our lives in the defense of our common fatherland.”
In April, Öcalan reportedly told a visiting delegation from the pro-Kurdish, left-wing Peoples’ Equality and Democracy (DEM) Party that “Netanyahu and Trump want to make Israel the hegemonic power in the Middle East. After Gaza, Lebanon, Syria it’s going to be the turn of Iran and Turkey. The Kurds are absolutely crucial for the realization of this scheme. Whoever succeeds in attaching the strategic position of the Kurds to itself will acquire the superiority in the Middle East.”
Erdoğan and Bahçeli subscribe to the same view; they believe that Israel, as the new hegemonic power in the Middle East represents a threat to Turkish interests and that it will – as Israeli official statements indeed suggest –exploit Turkey’s ethnic divisions. Three weeks ahead of his appeal to Öcalan in October 2024, Bahçeli explained, “When we call for peace in the world, we must also secure peace in our own country.” In an address to parliament the same month, Erdoğan emphasized the need to “fortify the home front” in the face of “Israeli aggression.”
IMPLICATIONS: As Bahçeli’s statement on June 17 about Israel seeking to “encircle Anatolia” makes clear, the Turkish leadership fears an Israeli alliance with the Kurds in Syria – and with the Kurds in Iran, the only group that responded positively to the Israeli exhortation to the Iranian people during the 12-day war to rise up and overthrow the Islamic republic.
In the weeks after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria last year, senior Turkish officials repeatedly emphasized their wish to see the PKK’s offshoot, the People’s Protection Units (YPG) disbanded. In December, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan described the elimination of the group as Ankara’s “strategic objective,” calling on Syria’s new leaders to dismantle the YPG, expel its commanders and restore central control of all Syrian territory. None of this has happened. The PKK’s affiliates remain in control over northern and northeastern Syria; with an estimated 80 to 100 000 armed militants and backed by the United States, the Syrian offshoot of the PKK retains a position of unmatched military strength and has not committed to disband and disarm.
Statements last year by Fidan suggested that Turkey would undertake an invasion of Rojava, the autonomous Kurdish region of Syria, if the new regime in Damascus failed to take action on its own. Ankara’s best hope today is to be able to co-opt the Syrian Kurds, allowing it to contain Israel’s influence. That in turn requires that Turkey first reaches an accommodation with its own Kurdish citizens, releases Kurdish political prisoners like Demirtaş and commits to respecting the democratic rights of the Kurds.
Turkey has a history of turning toward democracy in the face of perceived threats to its national security. In the 1940s, the authoritarian president İsmet İnönü recognized that Turkey, threatened by the Soviet Union, needed to be fully accepted by the West for its own protection. İnönü agreed to hold a free election in 1950 and duly resigned when he lost. At the turn of this century, a push for membership in the European Union prompted successive Turkish governments to implement liberal reforms required for its entry. It’s a very different story now.
On March 19, Ekrem İmamoğlu – the mayor of Istanbul and Erdoğan’s main rival – was detained by police in a dawn raid; he was later formally charged with corruption and suspended from his post as mayor. İmamoğlu’s arrest sparked the biggest demonstrations in Turkey in more than a decade. Yet, notwithstanding the outpouring of public support, İmamoğlu has – to all intents and purposes – been removed from the presidential equation.
Özgür Özel, the leader of the main opposition, center-left Republican People’s Party (CHP) whose members have endorsed İmamoğlu as the party’s presidential candidate, quipped that “the home front isn’t fortified by treating the opposition as the enemy.” The imprisoned Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirtaş called on the government to put an end to political harassments, pointing out that such practices “don’t contribute to fortifying the home front.” Öcalan is reported to have said that the peace process won’t succeed without the CHP. The pro-Kurdish DEM Party has stood by the CHP, condemning the arrest of İmamoğlu as an assault on democracy.
However, a progressive alliance of the CHP and the DEM Party remains elusive. The DEM Party is optimistic that its aspirations – notably enshrining Kurdish cultural and language rights in the constitution – are eventually going to be accommodated, in return for which the pro-Kurdish party may decide to assist Erdoğan’s reelection. That would require amending the Turkish constitution – which does not allow for a third presidential term – or calling a snap election.
The ruling coalition of Erdoğan’s Islamic conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Bahçeli’s MHP lacks the necessary parliamentary majority for both alternatives, making a grand bargain with the DEM Party its likely objective.
CONCLUSION: Co-opting the Kurds is both a national security imperative and a necessary condition for the perpetuation of the right-wing authoritarian Erdoğan-Bahçeli regime. The peace process enjoys broad popular support and the dissolution and disarmament of the PKK is likely going to boost Erdoğan’s standing. The end of the PKK and of the conflict that has plagued Turkey for four decades may well revive Erdoğan’s political fortunes.
But the question remains if societal reconciliation can be achieved when reforms for the Kurds are coupled with oppressive measures against the main opposition party. And the Kurds have reason to ask how much they can trust a democratization that is granted from above by a state that could renege on it when it no longer suits its interests.
Halil Karaveli is a Senior Fellow with the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center and the Editor of the Turkey Analyst. He is the author of Why Turkey is Authoritarian: From Atatürk to Erdoğan (Pluto Press)
Israel and Turkey’s Fragile Détente in Syria Needs U.S. Monitoring
By Barçın Yinanç
Competing visions for the future of post-Assad Syria has further deteriorated the already strained Turkish-Israeli relations. While Turkey’s clout in Syria stands in the way of Israel’s efforts to fragment Syria and undermine its territorial integrity, Israel’s actions disrupt Turkey’s strategy of a unified Syria. As a result both perceive each other as posing a threat to their respective national interests. Ankara will seek Washington’s support for crisis management and President Recep Tayip Erdoğan will use his good rapport with President Donald Trump to keep the tension from spiraling into a direct military confrontation with Israel. The fragile detente between Turkey and Israel will have to be monitored closely by the United States.
BACKGROUND: The fall of Bashar al-Assad on December 8, 2024, has opened a new confrontation line between Turkey and Israel, pitting Syria’s two neighbors against each other. On April 9, 2025, Azerbaijan hosted Turkish and Israeli officials for talks to ease the tension in Syria. Turkish Defense Ministry officials informed that the first technical talks were held in Baku to set up a de-confliction mechanism to avoid potential clashes or misunderstandings over military operations in Syria.
The end of the decades-long Assad regime was an unintended consequence of Israel’s military strategy following Hamas’ deadly attack on October 7, 2023. The Israeli army dealt a serious blow to Iran’s proxies in Syria, which unexpectedly led to the takeover of Damascus by opposition forces. The Islamist Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) spearheaded the offensive of the rebel forces, whose leader, Ahmet al-Sharaa, eventually became the country’s new, transitional leader. Al-Sharaa’s jihadist past and his affinity to Turkey, confirmed by the visit of the Turkish Intelligence Chief İbranim Kalın to Damascus only four days after the takeover, rang alarm bells in Israel. As early as January 10, 2025, an Israeli government commission released a warning that Syria could become the stage for a direct conflict between Turkey and Israel.A Turkey-oriented Syria ruled by Sunni Islamists could pose a greater threat to Israel than a Syria allied with Iran, the report of the so-called Nagel Commission, chaired by a former Israeli National Security Council head, concluded. The day Bashar al-Assad fled to Russia, the Israeli army moved units into several locations in a buffer zone that separates the Israeli side of the Golan Heights from the Syrian side of the border. Meanwhile, the Israeli air force has launched several offensives, striking hundreds of military targets to destroy the Syrian military assets, hitting strategic weapon stockpiles to stop “them from falling into the hands of the extremists.”Turkey maintained a rather restrained rhetoric even at that stage, avoiding harsh accusations against the Israeli government. “Israel has developed a precautionary package based on the worst possible scenario in Syria. As Israel is not sure about where the new administration (in Syria) will stand, it has endorsed a strategy; one which is very dangerous,” Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said in mid-December, adding that Ankara asked Israel, via intermediaries, to stop bombing.Al-Sharaa’s assurances early on that Damascus does not want any conflict with Israel and that the new regime will not let Syria be used as a launch-pad for attacks fell on deaf ears in Israel. Official statements that Israel will support Kurdish groups in northern Syria and the Druze minority in the south created an additional irritant at a time when Ankara threatened military action against the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in northern Syria.The Democratic Union Party (PYD), as well as the YPG, which makes up the backbone of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), are seen by Turkey as offshoots of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), but talks between the SDF and Damascus under U.S. mediation forced Turkey to refrain from military action in northeast Syria. As Turkey has embarked on a new peace process to solve the decades-long Kurdish problem, Ankara is waiting to see how the talks between Damascus and the SDG will proceed.The risk of confrontation between Turkey and Israel heightened following news about Turkish-Syrian military cooperation. While Turkish defense ministry officials insisted that the cooperation aimed at training the Syrian army, some media outlets known to have good connections to the Turkish government reported about plans to deploy forces in bases in Syria. One media outlet claimed that Turkey “has begun efforts to take control of Tiyas air base, also known as T4, and is preparing to deploy air defense systems there.”Within a few days following these reports, Israel bombed the sites and destroyed the T4 airport. The Israeli press reported that the strikes were meant to be a message to Turkey to stop its military expansion in Syria. Since Assad’s fall there have been more than 750 Israeli air and artillery strikes and more than 230 ground incursions. The day Israel carried out the air operation against the T 4 airport, Turkish foreign minister Fidan told an international outlet Turkey did not want a confrontation with Israel in Syria. Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met President Donald Trump in the Oval Office on April 7 and watched the U.S. president shower Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan with praise in front of the cameras. Trump said he could help mediate between the two leaders, while he asked Netanyahu to be “reasonable.” When it was revealed two days later that the two countries' officials met for de-conflicting talks, Washington was said to have encouraged the two capitals to de-escalate.
IMPLICATIONS: Had Hamas’ deadly October 7 attack not taken place, Ankara was preparing to host Netanyahu. Having missed the chance of mending fences with the previous Israeli government, which included more moderate forces, Erdoğan had decided to go ahead with normalization even though Netanyahu’s new cabinet included hawkish, ultra-right wing parties. But following October 7, the envoys were called back; Ankara even terminated officially all trade with Israel, although the Turkish opposition claims that the economic relations continue to be pursued indirectly.
Turkey sees Israel’s post-October 7 strategy as both inhuman in terms of the suffering and death in Gaza and as extremely dangerous for the region. Yet while President Trump’s plans to depopulate Gaza were met with harsh criticism by Foreign Minister Fidan, it is worth noting that some pro-government pundits voiced the possibility of migration for Gazans under the Islamic terminology ‘hijrah.” And ironically, Israel’s attacks against Iran’s proxies in Lebanon and Syria in the latter case played into the hands of Turkey, since it led to the unintended consequence of the collapse of the regime in Damascus.
Assad’s fall potentially opened the door for the return of more than three million Syrian refugees in Turkey and Ankara looks forward to reaping the economic benefits of the reconstruction of Syria. And more importantly, the YPG, which controlled north eastern Syria, faced the risk of losing its territorial and economic gains. Yet Israel’s stance on Syria disrupts all of Turkey’s plans. The two countries stand diametrically opposed on both the Palestinian problem and Syria’s future. However, the stakes in Syria are higher for Turkey compared to the Palestinian question. In fact, many in Turkey would question whether the Palestinian problem is a national cause. Developments in Syria, on the other hand, directly affect Turkey’s national interests.
With a 911 km land border, Syria’s stability is extremely critical for Turkey, and the solution of the Kurdish problem will depend on the talks between Syria’s new rulers and the Kurdish factions in the country. Ankara is firmly opposed to the federal solution that the Syrian Kurds favor; it fears that it would encourage similar aspirations among Turkey’s Kurds, and holds that regional stability will benefit from a unified Syria. Israel sees it differently; it’s no secret that Israel wants a weak and fragmented Syria. Israel’s policy is based on its calculation that a divided Syria is the best guarantee for its security while a united Syria could eventually pose a threat.
CONCLUSIONS: Competing visions for the future of post-Assad Syria has further deteriorated the already strained Turkish-Israeli relations. While Turkey’s clout in Syria stands in the way of Israel’s efforts to fragment Syria and undermine its territorial integrity, Israel’s actions disrupt Turkey’s strategy of a unified Syria. As a result both perceive each other as posing a threat to their respective national interests.
While a full-scale war between Turkey and Israel is highly unlikely, a misunderstanding or an accident spiraling into a military clash cannot be excluded. Turkish officials have repeatedly indicated that Turkey won’t remain idle if Israel continues its military incursions and have warned that Israel’s interferences in the sectarian conflicts in Syria – notably Israel’s siding with the Druze minority against the government in Damascus – risk exacerbating the internal turmoil. In addition, a potential Israeli involvement in the dialogue between Damascus and the SDF would be viewed as provocative by Ankara.
Convinced that Syria’s new rulers are under Turkey’s influence, President Trump appears to have no problem with Turkey’s clout in the country. Trump has met al-Sharaa during his visit to the Gulf and announced his decision to lift US sanctions on Syria. By contrast, Netanyahu will try to use his leverage over Washington to keep Syria weak and block any step that will help Syria’s new rulers consolidate their power. Ankara will seek Washington’s support for crisis management and Erdoğan will use his good rapport with Trump to keep the tension from spiraling into a direct military confrontation with Israel.
The fragile detente between Turkey and Israel will have to be monitored closely by the United States.
AUTHOR BIO: Barçın Yinanç is a foreign policy commentator at the Turkish news site t24
Turkey Competes with Israel and India to be a Major MENA Weapons Supplier
By Michael Tanchum
With record-breaking arms exports globally, Turkey’s growing market share in the Arab monarchies holds the potential to greatly expand Ankara’s role as a security provider across the Middle East and North Africa. At the same time, Turkey faces growing competition from Israel and India, which have significantly expanded their own weapons sales to the Arab monarchies, notably the UAE and Morocco. Deepening defense cooperation in ways that Turkey has not, Israel and India have engaged in the co-development of weapons systems with Arab defense firms and have established local weapons manufacturing in the Arab world. The next phase in the competition for the MENA weapons market share, as well as the regional geopolitical clout that accompanies it, could be determined by Saudi Arabia, raising Ankara’s geopolitical stakes in securing a sizable purchase of Turkish weapons by Riyadh.
Photo source: Defense Visual Information Distribution ServiceBACKGROUND:
In 2024, the Turkish defense industry posted yet another record-breaking year for exports, with overseas arms sales jumping 29% over the previous year. According to the Secretariat for Defense Industries (SSB), Turkey’s 2024 defense and aerospace exports totaled $7.2 billion. Three Turkish defense firms are among the ‘Top 100 arms-producing and military services companies’ list published annually by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Turkey’s Aselan, manufacturer of advanced military products for air, land and maritime forces, achieved the 54th spot in the SIPRI rankings, while drone-maker Baykar and Turkish Aerospace Industries ranked 69th and 78th respectively. Increasing its global market share through the sale of armored vehicles, drones, warships, and electronic warfare systems, the Turkish defense industry services about 180 countries. While Turkish arms sales provide Ankara with geopolitical clout within the NATO alliance and across several geographical theaters, Turkey’s growing sales in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region merit particular attention, as recent exports to Arab monarchies hold the potential to expand Turkey’s strategic partnerships and widen its role as a regional security provider.
In late January 2025, Turkish officials suggested that a major arms deal would soon be concluded with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the world’s second largest arms importer. It has been reported that Ankara expects to sign a $6 billion arms deal with Riyadh during Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s state visit to the kingdom in March 2025. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited his Saudi counterpart in Riyadh on January 28, 2025.
The 2025 deal builds upon Saudi Arabia’s 2023 agreement to buy high altitude drones from Baykar, but would be much larger in scope, including Turkey’s Altay main battle tank, missile defense systems, and perhaps even Turkey’s Kaan fighter jet, which passed its first test flight last year but still is far from operational readiness.
The Turkish-Saudi arms deal would be the capstone to Turkey’s prior advances in arms sales to the Arab monarchies, outside its strategic partnership with Qatar. One year ago, Aselan opened an office in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which had been a staunch geopolitical rival to Turkey for much of the previous decade. Signifying the marked turn around in relations between Ankara and Abu Dhabi, Aselan signed a cooperation agreement with the UAE defense firm Calidus. In the western end of the MENA region, Morocco has been increasing its arm purchases from Turkey, with Rabat having ordered 200 Cobra II armored vehicles from the Turkish defense firm Otokar in 2024. In early 2025, Morocco took delivery of its first consignment of Baykar’s Bayraktar Akıncı combat drones. Rabat’s 2024 purchase of these sophisticated high-altitude, long endurance drones builds upon its 2021 purchase of 13 Bayraktar TB2 drones from the company. Morocco’s arms purchases represent an important geopolitical nod toward Ankara, given Turkey’s relationship with Morocco’s neighbor and bitter regional rival Algeria.
IMPLICATIONS: Despite Turkey’s impressive expansion of its arms exports to previously more estranged Arab monarchies, the sales also indicate the limits of Turkey’s appeal and the power of competing arms exporting countries to provide a compelling alternative. Morocco is a case in point. While Baykar established a subsidiary in Morocco to provide maintenance and spare part services for its unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the scale of the company’s investment shows no indication of joint Turkish-Moroccan co-production or co-development. In contrast, Morocco has developed a deep and multi-variegated arms purchasing relationship with Israel including co-production.
Even before the December 2020 renormalization of relations between the two countries, Israel was Morocco’s third largest arms supplier, covering 11% of its military needs. The relationship has expanded considerably since, with Israel’s BlueBird Aero Systems announcing in 2024 that it had established a production plant in Morocco. Israel’s second largest defense firm by revenue, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) holds a 50% share in BlueBird, which supplies a variety of UAV systems to Morocco including the SpyX loitering munition and the vertical take-off and landing WonderB and ThunderB systems. In 2022, Morocco bought IAI’s MX air defense system for about half a billion dollars.
Israel’s three defense firms in the SIPRI rankings each placed in the top 50, far above their Turkish counterparts. Israel’s Elbit achieving the 27th spot while IAI and Rafael ranked 32nd and 44th respectively. Morocco has turned to Israel as an alternative to France, reportedly ordering 36 of Elbit’s Atmos 2000 self-propelled artillery systems in February 2025 to replace the French-made Caesar artillery systems after the French systems experienced technical failures. Similarly in 2024, Morocco purchased two Ofek 13 surveillances satellites to replace the two satellites developed for Morocco by Airbus Defense and Space France and Thales Alenia Space France. In terms of drones, the Moroccan military already uses Elbit’s Hermes UAVs as well as IAI’s Heron UAVs and Harop loitering munitions.
Israel is not the only weapons exporter that is keeping the Turkish defense industry looking over its shoulder. Israel’s strategic partner India has also started production of weapons systems in Morocco. Tata Advanced System, the weapons manufacturing subsidiary of Indian conglomerate the Tata Group, entered into a 2024 agreement with Morocco to produce its Kestral armored combat vehicle in an industrial zone in the Casablanca area. Tata’s Advanced Systems’ premier product, the Kestral is a WhAP 8X8 (Wheeled Armored Platform) developed in partnership with India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation for optimal for survivability, mobility, and firepower. Tata’s Moroccan factory will have an initial production capacity of 100 combat vehicles per year. With the Moroccan Armed Forces slated to receive a total of 150 Kestrals over time, while the remainder of the infantry fighting vehicles are slated for export in Africa potentially undercutting Turkey’s armored vehicle sales on the continent. A rising weapons exporter, India also has three defense firms that have placed in the SIPRI rankings, at 43rd, 67th, and 94th place respectively. If these companies follow Tata Advanced Systems example and position Morocco as India’s gateway to the African arms market, Turkey could lose significant African market share to India.
Morocco is a bellwether of an expanding trend among the Arab monarchies of the MENA region. Following the 2020 Abraham Accords that normalized relations between the UAE and Israel, the Emirates’s largest defense firm EDGE came to two agreements in 2021 to jointly develop advanced drone defense systems and unmanned naval vessels for anti-submarine warfare. Elbit similarly established a subsidiary in the UAE in 2021, entering into a 2022 contract to supply the Emirati Air Force with anti-missile and electronic warfare systems. Rafael opened its Abu Dhabi office in 2023, but the company had already established a joint venture with the UAE in 2021 for the co-development of Artificial Intelligence and big data technologies for the civilian market. Although Emirati-Israeli cooperation in weapons co-development slowed since the October 2023 outbreak of the Gaza War, cooperation continues to expand and points to the durability of the relationship. In January 2025, EDGE bought a 30% stake in the Israeli defense firm Third Eye, which develops drone detection technology used by the Israel Defense Forces and certain NATO members. At the same time, EDGE invested $12 million in a new, majority EDGE-owned joint venture with Thirdeye Systems to help Thirdeye Systems expand into new markets. The UAE and India are eyeing the development of a similar relationship.
CONCLUSIONS: The Turkish defense industry’s 2024 record-breaking exports are a testament to the success of Ankara’s 25-year effort to make Turkey into a global player in 21st century arms manufacturing. Turkey’s emergence as a significant weapons supplier has also been assisted by the decisive battlefield successes of the Turkish systems deployed in the Syrian and Libyan Civil Wars as well as the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. As an analysis published by Turkey’s SETA Foundation observed, “The program to build up the manufacturing capacities of Turkey’s defense industry developed as a correlate of Turkey’s strategic imperative to function geopolitically as an independent actor.” With enhanced strategic autonomy, Turkey has expanded its geopolitical footprint in the Middle East and North Africa, becoming a primary actor in Syria and Libya.
At the same time, the expansion of Israeli and Indian weapons sales to the Arab monarchies of the MENA region and especially the advent of co-development and local production in Morocco and the UAE reveals an apprehension about rising Turkish power in the region and a desire among the Arab monarchies to preserve their own autonomy. With Saudi Arabia yet to establish formal diplomatic ties with Israel, the manner and extent to which Ankara becomes a weapons supplier for Riyadh will shape the future strategic contours of Turkey’s role as a security provider in the MENA region.
AUTHOR BIO: Prof. Michaël Tanchum teaches international relations of the Middle East and North Africa at the University of Navarra, Spain and an associate fellow in the Economics and Energy at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C. He is also a Senior Associate Fellow at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Studies (AIES) and an affiliated scholar of the Centre for Strategic Policy Implementation at Başkent Universty in Ankara, Turkey (Başkent-SAM) and the NTU-SBF Centre for African Studies in Singapore. @michaeltanchum
Increasing Rivalries Between Iran and Turkey after Assad’s Fall
By Vali Kaleji
With the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, the long-standing Turkish-Iranian rivalry has intensified in the region. Ankara will make the most of the challenges that Iran has suffered in the Middle East, advancing its geopolitical and economic goals and ambitions in the region to the detriment of Iranian interests. Tehran fears that Turkey will now be emboldened to make further headway in the South Caucasus to the detriment of Iranian interests and that it will disseminate Pan-Turkism and incite ethnic unrest and divisions in the Azeri and Kurdish areas in the northwest of Iran. Ultimately though the two countries prefer caution and seek to contain their rivalry. Turkey and Iran have a shared interest in limiting the scope of their rivalry, foreclosing military escalation.
BACKGROUND: Shiite Iran and Sunni Turkey have maintained relations relation without direct military confrontation for nearly 400 years, with their common border unchanged since the signing of the Treaty of Zuhab in 1639. Notwithstanding, Turkish-Iranian rivalry has been a constant in the Middle East and in the Caucasus. Since 2011 the geopolitical competition between Iran and Turkey has largely played out in Syria, where Ankara supported the rebellion and Tehran the Assad regime. Turkey opposes the agenda of the so-called Axis of Resistance, groups aligned with and/or backed by Iran operating across the Middle East. Ankara’s support for Hamas has been only rhetorical and it has not displayed any sympathy for Hezbollah in Lebanon. On November 21, 2024, after a missile attack targeted a cargo ship in the Red Sea, Ankara sent 6 warships to counter and suppress the Yemeni Houthis, Iran’s proxies. Although “The Astana Process” was launched in 2017 at the initiative of Iran, Russia and Turkey to reduce tensions in Syria, the competition and differences between Iran and Russia with Turkey persisted.</>
Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei blamed the United States, Israel and Turkey for the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, after a lightning offensive by Sunni Islamist rebels toppled the regime last year. He said in a public speech that “there should be no doubt that what happened in Syria was plotted in the command rooms of the United States and Israel. We have evidence for this. One of the neighbouring countries of Syria also played a role, but the primary planners are the US and the Zionist regime”. There was no doubt that the neighbouring country that the Iranian leader had in mind was Turkey. Indeed, Iranian analysts largely agreed that the evolving situation in Syria would lead to a new phase of regional competition between Tehran and Ankara.
Turkey has demonstrated that it intends to play a decisive role in shaping the future of Syria and it stands to reap the benefits of the reconstruction of the country. Iran meanwhile, whose overall economic expenditure in Syria is valued at around $20-30 billion, can no longer expect to enjoy any access to Syria. Moreover, the loss of Syria deprives Iran of crucial transit corridors. The creation of the Iran-Iraq-Syria corridor was one of Iran's strategic goals to strengthen its influence in the Middle East region and secure access to the Mediterranean. But with the fall of the Assad regime this transit corridor is no longer viable. Turkey, meanwhile, is seeking implement a 17-billion-dollar “Development Road Project,” which consists of two rail and land routes, in cooperation with Iraq. This transit project could potentially bloc Iran's attempts in transit and transportation in the Persian Gulf, Iraq and the Eastern Mediterranean.
IMPLICATIONS: Iran is also concerned about the revival of the Qatar-Turkey pipeline project with the transfer of Qatar's natural gas through a pipeline that passes through Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria to Turkey and brings it to the European market. Although this pipeline faces important challenges – it would notably pass through currently Kurdish-controlled areas in northern Syria where Turkey is yet to assert its authority and secure the disarmament of the PKK affiliated Kurdish militia – its realization can be an alternative not only for the export of Iranian gas to Turkey, but also for the export of Russian gas to Europe. There is no doubt that the revival of the Qatar-Turkey pipeline project would increase Turkey’s bargaining power in the pricing of imported gas from the two competing powers Iran and Russia.
Moreover, Tehran fears that Turkey, after the fall of the Assad regime, will be emboldened to make further headway in the South Caucasus to the detriment of Iranian interests. Specifically, there is a concern in Iran, as well as in Armenia, that Azerbaijan, encouraged and supported by Turkey, will launch an attack on the Syunik province in the south of Armenia in order to realize the Zangezur Corridor and a direct land connection to Nakhichevan.
Iran is strongly opposed to the Zangezur Corridor due to the threat of blockage of the common border with Armenia – without the supervision and control of Armenia – and such an attack, if it were to take place, would obviously have far reaching regional ramifications, further tipping the balance of power in the South Caucasus in favour of the Baku-Ankara axis. A realization of the Zangezur Corridor as a part of the Middle Corridor, parallel to the realization of the “Development Road Project” between Iraq and Turkey, will inevitably reduce Iran's transit advantages in the region. Further, the realization of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, along with the revival of the Qatar-Turkey gas pipeline project represents an important challenge for Iran's gas exports in the region.
Another major, indeed existential concern for Iran is that Turkey may seek to disseminate Pan-Turkism and incite ethnic unrest and divisions in the Azerbaijani and Kurdish areas in the northwest of Iran. Such concerns have been fuelled by the December, 2024 launch of the Persian-language service of Turkey's state television channel (TRT). Tehran is particularly sensitive, not least since the director of the TRT media Mehmet Sobacı on October 14, 2024 said “We are to open the TRT Persian channel at the end of this year. We must disturb Iran; we must disturb Iran!” Although he was subsequently dismissed, the controversial comments sparked debate and was met with strong criticism in Iran. In what looked like a direct response to the Turkish move, the head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Peyman Jebeli on January 21, 2025 announced that a Turkish section of Press TV will start broadcasting.
CONCLUSIONS: With the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, Iran has lost a crucial strategic ally in the Middle East and its longstanding regional policy has suffered challenges. Turkey, meanwhile, has gained the strategic upper hand and is advancing its geopolitical and economic goals and ambitions in the region which worries Iran. But the two countries prefer caution and seek to contain their rivalry. This was on display when İbrahim Kalın, the head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) on February 8 visited Tehran for discussions with senior Iranian security officials, including Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Akbar Ahmadian and Minister of Intelligence Seyed Esmail Khatib. The discussions focused on Syria, the war in Gaza and on countering the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Daesh (ISIL or ISIS), and other terrorist groups, as well as other shared security threats. This suggests that Iran is aware of the threat to security by the PKK-affiliated Syrian Kurds. For this reason, Iran has welcomed Abdullah Ocalan’s call to disarm and dissolve the PKK. Such a move would have dangerous repercussions in the Kurdistan region of Iraq and possibly also in the Kurdish regions in Iran.
Ankara will try to make the most of the challenges that Iran has suffered in the Middle East. In addition, Turkey feels that it has the advantage in the new round of competition with Iran. But Turkey and Iran nonetheless recognize that they have a shared interest in limiting the scope of their rivalry, foreclosing military escalation.
Vali Kaleji is based in Tehran, Iran, and holds a Ph.D. in Regional Studies, Central Asia and Caucasian Studies.
Visit also
Joint Center Publications
Op-ed Halil Karaveli "The Rise and Rise of the Turkish Right", The New York Times, April 8, 2019
Analysis Halil Karaveli "The Myth of Erdogan's Power", Foreign Policy, August 29, 2018
Analysis Svante E. Cornell, A Road to Understanding in Syria? The U.S. and Turkey, The American Interest, June 2018
Op-ed Halil Karaveli "Erdogan Wins Reelection", Foreign Affairs, June 25, 2018
Article Halil Karaveli "Will the Kurdish Question Secure Erdogan's Re-election?", Turkey Analyst, June 18, 2018
Research Article Svante E. Cornell "Erbakan, Kisakürek, and the Mainstreaming of Extremism in Turkey", Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, June 2018
Analysis Svante E. Cornell "The U.S. and Turkey: Past the Point of No Return?", The American Interest, February 1, 2018
Op-ed Svante E. Cornell "Erdogan's Turkey: the Role of a Little Known Islamic Poet", Breaking Defense, January 2, 2018
Research Article Halil Karaveli "Turkey's Authoritarian Legacy", Cairo Review of Global Affairs, January 2, 2018