By Gareth H. Jenkins (vol. 03, no. 19 of the Turkey Analyst)
The restructuring of the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), which is responsible for appointments and disciplinary procedures in the Turkish judicial system, was one of the key reforms in the package of constitutional amendments which were approved in a referendum on September 12, 2010. During the referendum campaign, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) claimed that the restructuring of bodies such as the HSYK and the Constitutional Court were prerequisites for the establishment of what it termed an “independent judiciary”. The reformed HSYK held its first meeting on October 25, 2010. Yet both its composition and its initial decisions have reinforced, rather than allayed, growing concerns both about the politicization of judicial processes in Turkey and the increasing authoritarianism of the AKP.
By Halil M. Karaveli (vol. 3, no. 19 of the Turkey Analyst)
Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of the Republican People’s party (CHP), Turkey’s main opposition party, has now decisively taken charge of the party. He signals that a departure from old, ideological habits is impending and vows that the “New CHP” will introduce freedom. However, there is a fateful disconnect between Kılıçdaroğlu’s message and the resentments of the core constituency of his party. Kılıçdaroğlu will have difficulty escaping the fate that is usually reserved for well-meaning reformers who challenge the certainties of ossified belief systems.
By Richard Weitz (vol. 3, no. 18 of the Turkey Analyst)
The recent, unprecedented joint exercise between the Turkish and Chinese air forces is a signal event. Turkey and China are rapidly developing not only their economic relations, but the two countries have also been drawn closer by a shared ambition to question the Western-dominated world order. Although it is probable that U.S. pressure will ultimately work to constrain Turkey’s potential interest in developing close defense ties with China, the evolution of the Turkish-Chinese relationship may nonetheless have important geopolitical and strategic repercussions.
By Halil M. Karaveli (vol. 3, no. 18 of the Turkey Analyst)
Turkish opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is seeking to promote a secularist-conservative reconciliation. However, instead of seizing on the opportunity to advance the cause of mutual understanding and societal cohesion, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has chosen to uphold the battle line against the secularists. The maximalist response of the AKP to the CHP’s headscarf overture does not inspire any confidence that the victorious Sunni conservatives are ever going to bother to try to accommodate the losing side in the battle over Turkey’s identity.
The Turkey Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey. It includes topical analysis, as well as a summary of the Turkish media debate.
Sign up for upcoming events, latest news and articles from the CACI Analyst