By Richard Weitz (vol. 3, no. 22 of the Turkey Analyst)

Turkish foreign policy was more visible in 2010 than ever before. If one is optimistic, one can hazard that we will see a “regression toward the mean” in Turkey’s relations with the West. If 2010 was generally a bad year for that relationship, the situation should improve in 2011, partly on the principle that things could hardly get any worse. While the events that drew the most attention were those that involved Iran and Israel, Turkey’s ties with Russia and China developed under the radar and could in fact prove even more momentous.

By Halil M. Karaveli and M. K. Kaya (vol. 3, no. 21 of the Turkey Analyst)

U.S. power still matters in Turkey, and the revelation that the AKP does not enjoy universal American support is unwelcome news for the ruling party. The perception that it enjoyed full U.S. support was instrumental in the AKP’s ascendancy. The dissemination of the U.S. diplomatic correspondence from Ankara has called that myth into question, indeed effectively depriving the AKP of its cherished American cover. The reactions of leading AKP representatives to the Wikileaks publication are suggestive of a significant uneasiness. They speak of an anxiety that the U.S. could turn against the AKP, that it has indeed already done so.

By Gareth H. Jenkins (vol. 3, no. 21 of the Turkey Analyst)

There are increasing signs that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President Abdullah Gül are preparing for a major confrontation if the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) wins the next Turkish general election in June 2011. Erdoğan has repeatedly declared that the AKP will introduce a new constitution if is returned to power. He has yet to announce any details, although AKP officials report that it will replace the current parliamentary system with a presidential or semi-presidential one; after which, Erdoğan will attempt to have himself elected president. The main problem is that Gül has made it clear that he is not prepared to step aside.